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I
INTRODUCTION
The first year of the Reagan Administration produced a set of changes in
political-economic relationships so novel as to merit the denomination
"revolutionary." The sobriquet, Reaganomics, is used in this article's title on
purpose to emphasize the importance of President Reagan's personal role in
engineering great change. Although the reorientation of the tax structure
constitutes the centerpiece of Reaganomics, it must be noted that the
economic package also includes reductions in domestic programs,
bureaucracies, and support. Moreover, another aspect of the Reagan
Administration's revolutionary reallocation of state values has taken the form
of nonincremental increases in defense spending.
Evidence of revolution may be found in authoritative policy enactments
which document historic change. On February 5, 1981, President Reagan
spoke to the nation from the Oval Office and called for a reduction in
personal taxes of 30% over a three-year period. In addition, speaking further
to the supply-side ethos, the President proposed accelerated depreciation
rewards to business to encourage investment and growth.1 On February 18,
the President submitted the details of his tax cut plan along with proposed
budgetary reductions of $49 billion in domestic program spending in a special
"white paper" which constituted the Administration's revision of the Carter
Economic Report of 1981. 2
On July 26, 1981, Congress adopted an omnibus reconciliation measure
(popularly titled the Gramm-Latta proposal) which trimmed $38.2 billion
from spending authority previously apportioned among some eighty-three
domestic programs.3 On July 29, 1981, the House of Representatives
accepted the Senate's version of what would become the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, 4 which reduced individual tax rates by 25% over the
succeeding thirty-three months. Moreover, the measure contained a
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provision for future implementation of the indexing of taxes to counter the
impact of inflation on tax bracket escalation, and a multitude of provisions
which afforded tax breaks to encourage the supply side to invest, to expand,
and to profit. 5
While the above acts of Congress may be regarded as indicators of
revolutionary change, the nature and qualities of that change are what
constitute the substantive revolutionary aspect. When the term
"revolutionary" is used in the contemporary, benign, democratic sense, one
usually thinks first of scope. 'That is, the term is reserved for large, sweeping,
or fundamental alterations in some aspect of the existing order of things.
Students of policymaking have often noted that such changes are
accompanied by and based upon relatively little knowledge, both theoretical
and empirical. For many policy analysts, normal decisionmaking is
incremental (methodical modifications at the margins of an existing corpus of
policy). 6 Less frequently do decisionmakers forego caution and boldly strike
out in new directions. Such revolutionary dispositions may be motivated by
crisis, ideological zeal, or as some theorists have suggested, "grand
oppportunities."' 7 Elements of each of these can be seen in Ronald Reagan's
fervid adoption of the preachments of supply-side theory as a prescription for
the restoration of an ideal America of his personal vision. No matter that
supply-side theory lacked the imprimatur of the professional economics
community; neither theoretical nor empirical consensus characterized that
discipline in any case.8 A historical parallel in point is the Roosevelt
Revolution which charted the course of American history for a half-century
and was similarly flexible in its intellectual underpinnings.
Another quality which characterizes modern revolutionary thrusts is pace.
Sweeping changes are not only made, but made in a whirlwind of seemingly
frenzied activity. The new Administration in this instance reprogrammed the
national policy agenda in a matter of three months; issuing its own economic
report as well as a 400-page statement of budget revisions for fiscal 1982.9
The elements of perceived crisis which influenced these moves can be
summed up in a few numbers printed in President Carter's last economic
report: the gross national product was in absolute decline (-0.3%);
unemployment stood at 7.1%; and most nettlesome, inflation was marked by
a 13.5% rise in the consumer price index in 1980.10
5. Fessler, Reagan Economic Plan Nears Enactment, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1371, 1375-76
(1981).
6. See A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 15 (3d ed. 1979); Lindblom,
The Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959); Lindblom, Decision-Making in Taxation
and Expenditures, in PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION 295-336 (1961).
7. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 68 (1963).
8. See L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS (1983).
9. See White House Report on the Program for Economic Recovery, supra note 2; EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1982 BUDGET
REVISIONS: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON BUDGET SAVINGS (1981) (PrEx 2.8/7:982).
10. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 138, 293, 316 (1981) (Pr 39.9:981).
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Finally, the Reagan policy coup fulfilled another of the theoretical
expectations for policy revolution: it started at the top and was consummated
at the highest levels. Professors Braybrooke and Lindblom observed that
[t]he political locus for decisions of this kind lies in the deliberations of policymakers
and their advisers at the highest level . . . [T]ypically, the decision effecting large
change is not made at the lower levels of government, nor, specifically, is it made in
the middle or lower ranks of the administrative service.
1 I
The central purpose of the present inquiry is not to define policy
revolution but to explain its occurence in the Reagan case. Such an analysis
takes an essentially political form rather than an economic one. We are
interested in exploring how political resources can be applied to the
governmental process to achieve massive (in this case, economic) policy
change. For purposes of analysis, three defining perspectives will be posed.
The first perspective has its site mainly in the executive domain and looks to
questions of policy formulation, planning, and the management of people and
processes involved in these activities. Thus, this perspective is concerned
with the process of setting the policy agenda. The second perspective focuses
on the process of the adoption of policy and thus the environment shifts to
the legislative arena. Here phenomena of conflict and bargaining, both within
the institution and between legislative and executive actors, mark political
activity. Finally, departing from institutional perspectives, a category of
analysis which is defined by the policy environment and the role of personal,
presidential leadership within it, is examined. A rather protracted footnote to
the considerations raised by these three perspectives will look to a second
stage of the policy innovation process. Thus-and to extend the metaphor of
revolution backward to its historical roots-note will be made of the
Thermidorean reaction to the shock of revolution. The official legislative
reaction of 1982 is of course the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act.' 2
II
SETrING THE AGENDA
A. World View
To understand the making of the revolution of 1981, one must begin with
Ronald Reagan himself. The process of policy formulation is so complex, so
disjointed, so subject to delays and the claims of institutionalized veto groups,
that only a committed and determined manager can hope to force the system
to realize his broad goals. It was that commitment and zeal for achievement of
a general policy consequence in tune with the President's world view that held
the system together, at least for a crucial time.' 3 The idea of world view
conveys an important distinction about the role of basic values in motivating
11. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 68-69.
12. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
13. "World view" alludes toJ.D. Barber's characterization of those "primary, politically relevant
beliefs, particularly his conception of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts
of the time." J. BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 7-8 (1977).
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and reinforcing policy choice. The more familiar term, ideology, suggests-at
least in its historic European origins-a greater measure of intellectual depth
and philosophical coherence than characterizes the outlook of most American
presidents. Reagan adheres to a loosely structured personal value scheme
which is grounded in a generally conservative twist applied to traditional,
middle American, middle class social precepts. This melange of attitudes
includes, but is not limited to, ideals of individualism, the efficacy of effort, the
supremacy of private social arrangements over governmental regulation, and
of private, unfettered economic enterprise. Importantly, the view assumes
that social and economic rewards should be distributed in accord with the
energy and effectiveness of individualistic enterprise.' 4
The reason Reagan has so often been characterized as an ideologue is that
he has held these views long, resolutely, and publicly. His determination to
oversee a policy revolution and his conviction that it would be possible is not
surprising in one who believes literally in the Horatio Alger myth. When the
New York Times queried Reagan about his favorite books, his response was
heavily weighted in favor of the self-help, do-or-die adventure classics, from
King Arthur to Frank Merriwell at Yale. In explaining his choices, Reagan
admitted:
I'm a sucker for hero worship to this day .... All in all, as I look back I realize that
all my reading has left an abiding belief in the triumph of good over evil. These were
heroes who lived by the standards of morality and fair play.15
A related aspect of his outlook is an incurable optimism. All those who
examine Reagan are struck by this penchant. One biographer has noted:
"Life is just one grand sweet song, so start the music," Reagan had written as a high
school senior in 1928, the year before the great stock market crash. More than half a
century later, this pervasive optimism was driving the economic decisions of his
administration. 16
Herbert Stein, a Nixon-Ford era economic adivser who participated on
Reagan's Economic Policy Adivsory Board, relates with some incredulity that
when he told the President that the art of economic forecasting was
insufficiently developed to guarantee that inflation could be reduced without
recession, the President simply brushed aside such doubts about the
inevitability of his program's success.17
It is not surprising that a mind-set of this sort would find the claims of the
supply-side fraternity to be a congenial policy vehicle. The essential
proposition-that the appetites and energies of economic man would be
enhanced by state activity which removed the hand of regulation and
rewarded, through the tax system, the instinct to invest, expand and grow-
was beguiling. With the assistance of hypotheses offered by Arthur Laffer, a
conservative University of Southern California economist, and by a drum beat
14. On the American conservative tradition, see C. RossrrER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA (1955).
15. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1981, Book Review, § 7, at 21, col. 1.
16. L. CANNON, REAGAN 322 (1982).
17. See H. STEIN, PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMICS: THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY FROM ROOSEVELT
TO REAGAN AND BEYOND 395 n.9 (1984).
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of support by Wall Street Journal economics writer, Jude Wanniski, the
syllogism concluded that even a massive cut in tax rates at the upper margins
would be compensated by increased tax receipts flowing from expansion and
economic growth. Thus, tax reductions and balanced budgets could be
achieved together. This dogma sounded distressingly like wanting it "both
ways" or, as Herbert Stein described it, "the economics of joy."' 8
The measure of Ronald Reagan's commmitment to the general notions of
Kemp-Roth was his capacity to withstand the doubts and criticisms of many of
his most distinguished Republican confreres. Even during the campaign,
orthodox, conservative economists and former officials such as Nixon's
Council of Economic Advisers Chairman, Alan Greenspan, Nixon's Treasury
Secretary, George Shultz, former Federal Reserve Chairman, Arthur Bums,
and long-time academician, Milton Friedman, tried to persuade the candidate
to question such acts of faith as reliance on "Laffer Curves."' 19 Nevertheless,
the candidate prevailed throughout the campaign and, after November 4,
1980, proceeded, as President, to transform campaign pledges into public
policy.
B. Machinery of Choice
In one sense, candidate Reagan had set the public agenda even as he took
the oath of office. Professor Kingdon makes the distinction between "the
governmental agenda"-the list of subjects that are getting attention-and "the
decision agenda"-the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are
up for an active decision. 20 The first version of agenda-setting was
accomplished; there remained the more daunting task of organizing active
decisionmaking. The performance of that task depends largely upon the
president's capacity as administrative leader and manager. To move from
general dispositions toward problems to specific proposals designed to treat
them is to move from individual preference to collective decisionmaking. The
American presidency is amply endowed with resources for managing the
policy process, chiefly personnel management, organizational controls, and
personal persuasion. How effectively these resources are deployed will
usually determine the degree to which the president does in fact manage the
decision agenda.
Since the Employment Act of 194621 the institutional presidency has
spawned a subpresidency that might be termed an economic policymaking
secretariat. The major institutional presences are now well established. The
Treasury Department (DOT), of course, takes its origins with the Republic
itself. The other major components are twentieth-century elaborations. The
18. Id. at 235. The supply-side canon has a substantial press and periodical base but the chief
works which have gained wide public attention include G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981), and
J. WANNISKY, THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS (1978).
19. See Silk, On the Supply Side, in REAGAN THE MAN, THE PRESIDENT (H. Smith ed. 1980).
20. SeeJ. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 4 (1984).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1976).
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had its beginnings as a Bureau in
1921. The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) is a Wilsonian product, devised
in 1913 to reform and regulate the banking system. The Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA) came about as the administrative agent of the Employment
Act's declaration of macroeconomic policy objectives. 22 Thus, since 1946,
national economic planning has been legitimated and its responsibility lodged
in the presidency that has the CEA as a permanent source of economic advice
and judgment. 23 Of course, economic advice and information flow from a
host of other specialized agencies of government and various ad hoc advisory
bodies that presidents establish to suit their own decisional styles. Yet, the
"big four" stand out as preeminent in the councils of economic planning.
Although the OMB, CEA, and DOT meet and consult regularly to frame
the periodic economic forecasts as the "Troika," it has become practice in
recent years to include the Fed in these information exchanges and
forecasting ventures. What is more notable, however, is that each of these
institutions has specific and somewhat different functions-and therefore
perspectives-even as they participate in a collective process. The Treasury,
the government's bill-payer, performs a function that concentrates the
attention of its secretaries wonderfully on financially cautious paths. The
Director of OMB clearly feels some of the same kinds of chastening
responsibilities as does the Secretary of the Treasury, but the Director has
emerged in recent decades more as a special presidential agent whose
obligation is to protect the president's agenda from bureaucratic intrusions
and to help shape this agenda. The Fed is the historic monetarist bastion, and
its independent authority over the money supply and interest rates frequently
makes it an object of presidential importunity rather than White House
control. Only the CEA has a purely advisory role, unencumbered by
administrative responsibilities. The Council can profit by its status as a
ministry of pure wisdom; it can also suffer from its status as a political actor
without a political base in governing resonsibilities or political support in the
form of citizen clienteles. In the end, even more than its institutional
partners, the CEA is only what the president decides to make of it.
The importance of these institutions to the policy formation process is that
each exercises legitimate and routine functions that affect planning and policy
choice. General notions about fiscal policy may set the stage, but quarterly
forecasts by the Troika, calendar-driven OMB decisions, meetings of the
Open Market Committee of the Fed, and even the February issuance of the
economic report are all activities which cannot be ignored. In a similar vein,
Treasury reports on gold-outflow, revised consumer price and wage indices,
22. Those objectives are stated as follows: "to promote maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power." Employment Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 304, § 2, 60 Stat. 23, 23.
23. There is a substantial and growing literature investigating these institutions. Leading
studies include C. ANDERSON, A HALF CENTURY OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY MAKING, 1914-1964
(1965); L. BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1921-1979
(1979); E. FLASH, ECONOMIC ADVICE AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (1965); and L. PIERCE, THE
POLITICS OF FISCAL POLICY FORMATION (1971).
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and reports of changes in private savings behavior are bits of information
laden with implications which emerge routinely from the bureaucratic
establishment. As such, they suggest, collectively, some limitations on
presidential mastery of the decisional flow.
24
A major determinant of the president's ability to utilize the bureaucratic
machinery to advance his programs is his capacity to appoint the heads of the
policy agencies. For most presidents, this task itself is largely delegated, and
the intended linkage between people and policy success is more in the nature
of guesswork than certainty. Reagan's experience attests to these truths. A
Transition Advisory Committee began during the pre-election period to
organize the staffing process. After the inauguration, presidential counselor
Edwin Meese proceeded to create the economic secretariat. 25 The results
were broadly in accord with the President's conservative preferences. The
difficulty that would emerge, of course, reflected the inconsistencies among
components of the President's economic objectives (tax cuts, along with
defense spending growth, along with balanced budgets). When William
Simon, as first choice, rejected the Treasury post, the talent hunters proposed
Donald Regan of Merrill-Lynch as a substitute. True believers of the supply
side were not enthusiastic, since Regan was hardly one of that fraternity. In
July, 1980, he had testified before the House Ways and Means Committee
against the Kemp-Roth tax cut proposal.26 Nevertheless, he was found
acceptable by the group and the President because he was a well-known
conservative and congenial to Wall Street. 27
In the case of the OMB directorship, the appointee, David Stockman, had
campaigned for the job.2 8 Congressman Jack Kemp also lobbied for the
appointment. Stockman was a longtime associate and ideological ally
Congressman Kemp, and together they coauthored the campaign advi,
document, "Avoiding a GOP Dunkirk." 29 Although Stockman would initially
be identified as a hard-line supply-sider, his convictions quickly waned during
the first year.
Certainly, the bastion of zealotry for supply-side theory was to be found in
the second level of Treasury. The Undersecretary for Tax Policy, Norman B.
Ture, had conservative University of Chicago and Wharton School credentials
as well as experience in the Nixon government. The Assistant Secretary for
International Economics, Paul Craig Roberts, who had been an aide to Jack
24. For a thoughtful analysis of the impact of routines, standard operating procedures, and
established bureaucratic repertoires on decisionmaking, see G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION 78-95
(1971).
25. The economic secretariat is a body of economic counsellors, meeting routinely, whose work
overlaps with formal institutions.
26. Gregg & Tate, Reagan Economic Officials Put Diferences Behind Them, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
259 (1981).
27. See L. BARRETT, GAMBLING wrrH HISTORY: RONALD REAGAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE 67 (1983).
28. See id. at 70.
29. The text of the memorandum, "Avoiding a GOP Dunkirk," is printed as an appendix in W.
GREIDER, THE EDUCATION OF DAVID STOCKMAN AND OTHER AMERICANS 139-59 (1982). See also L.
CANNON, supra note 16, at 309.
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Kemp, joined Ture as the leading torchbearer for supply-side orthodoxy
through the developing internal struggles.30
In contrast, the Council of Economic Advisers was in no sense a supply-
side armory. Chairman Murray Weidenbaum was a traditional conservative
economist whose reputation was based more upon his seminal work on
regulation and its economic costs than on macroeconomic theory. Adviser
Jerry Jordan was the monetarist presence on the CEA and Adviser William
Niskanen, Jr., an old Reagan hand, saw some merit in the supply-side
argument but was too much an intellectual renegade to conform to any
particular economic dogma. 3' Needless to say, Fed Chairman Paul Volcker
was an independent presence, immune from direct presidential control.
C. Managerial Style
Most of the time, presidential-level officials do not offer their advice in
one-on-one situations. The idiosyncratic organizational stamp which a
president places upon his policy system can have portentous consequences for
outcomes. The chief characteristic of Reagan's management style is a long
established belief in maximum delegation. He sees executive responsibility as
that of setting broad objectives and depending heavily on subordinates to
fashion the means for their achievement. Inevitably, this belief would lead (as
was the case with his recent predecessors) to substantial dependence upon his
White House chief secretariat, composed of Edwin Meese, James Baker, and
Michael Deaver. 32 Consistent with these notions was Reagan's wish to fashion
a personal version of cabinet government. Early on in his Administration, he
created six cabinet councils designed to filter policy planning through broader
functional units.3 3 The Economic Policy Council was chaired by Secretary
Regan and included Stockman and Wiedenbaum as well as Commerce
Secretary Malcolm Baldridge and Trade Representative John Block. The first
job of this council was to build and articulate an Administration consensus in
favor of Reaganomics. Secretary Regan, earlier apostate, cast away all doubts
and called for the President's tax program at once, arguing that it "cannot
wait until budget outlays are reduced." Others of the economic policy elite
quickly concurred. 34
The early consensus would, however, be short-lived. The bad news of
deficit recalculations suggested that it was unrealistic to expect the magic of
supply-side theory to work. Voices within the Administration began arguing
for a smaller tax cut, delays in the implementation of the cuts and/or even a
scaling back of the massive defense budgetary increases. OMB Director
30. See R. BROWNSTEIN & N. EASTON, REAGAN'S RULING CLASS 12 (1982); see also P. ROBERTS, THE
SUPPLY SIDE REVOLUTION (1984).
31. See R. BROWNSTEIN & N. EASTON, supra note 30, at 70-74.
32. See L. BARRETr, supra note 27, at 80-106 for a good description. Cannon's summary of
Reagan's philosophy gives the title to chapter 22 of his biography: "The Delegated Presidency,"
supra note 16, at 371-401.
33. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
34. Gregg & Tate, supra note 26, at 259.
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Stockman took the lead in an attempt to bring about a recalibration of
Reagan's policy timetable. This fallen supply-sider now engaged in a series of
strategies to cut Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger's budget, give aid and
comfort to congressional critics and Republican supply-side skeptics, and
maneuver the President into a position of compromising on the tax cut. The
deviousness of the Stockman "subversion" and the measure of his own
disillusionment with the early hopes would later be embarrassingly publicized
in the famous Atlantic Monthly article based upon a year's candid interviews
that the Director had given to a Washington Post journalist. Let one quotation
suffice:
Some of the naive supply-siders just missed this whole dimension . . . . You don't
stop inflation without some kind of dislocation. . . . The supply-siders have gone too
far. They created this nonpolitical view of the economy, where you are going to have
big changes and abrupt turns, and their happy vision of this world of growth and no
inflation with no pain ....
Whenever there are great strains or changes in the economic system, .... it tends
to generate crackpot theories, which then find their way into legislative channels.
3 5
For the most part, Stockman's views were shared by the White House
staffers who were especially sensitive to the political consequences of deficits
and unemployment. The supply-siders within the Administration fought back
with the usual bureaucratic weapons of memorandums and press leaks, and
Craig Roberts' ongoing journalistic advocacy in the Wall Street Journal.36 The
press, of course, was indulgent of the fresh copy it received periodically
concerning internal administrative conflict.
In retrospect, it seems almost surprising that the combination of internal
pressures on the President from his own lieutenants in favor of reformulation
and the skepticism of part of his own congressional leadership about
Reaganomics did not delay the presidential economic agenda far more than it
did. The President's loose managerial style and easy tolerance of discord
among his subordinates made agenda control tenuous at times. The
explanation for the President's first triumph surely lies in his personal
determination based upon the conviction, however misguided, that his tax
program amounted to a heroic achievement on the road to an ideal America.
Moreover, his ability to retain the apparent allegiance of a majority of
Americans was politically instrumental in overcoming the divided counsels of
his own government. This lesson would be repeated at the next stage of the
policy process.
III
PUSHING THE AGENDA THROUGH CONGRESS
Although agenda-setting and legislative bargaining are used as different
analytical constructs, of course the activities and time periods during which
they predominate overlap. Thus, in the case of Reagan's economic policy
35. Greider, The Education of David Stockman, ATL. MONTHLY 27, 54 (Dec. 1981).
36. See P. ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 108, 117-18, 141.
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initiative, while formulation activities involved intra-executive negotiations
and legislative activities involved interbranch relationships, each of these
processes conditioned the other at various points. For example, the initial
presentation of the tax program to Congress incorporated compromises in
the President's earlier intentions in order to anticipate congressional
opposition. These minor compromises were brought about as a result of the
persuasiveness of the President's advisors. Thus, in the opening legislative
gambit, indexing of tax brackets was delayed until July 1, rather than taking
effectJanuary 1, the goal of balancing the budget (given the program's revised
cost calculations) was moved back to 1984 from the earlier 1983 target, and a
reduction of the top bracket rate on unearned income was dropped.37
Nevertheless, the predominant form of political activity in the legislative
stage differs significantly from that of the executive stage. In the earlier stage,
hierarchical authority does play an important part-hence the President's
refusal to give in to his advisors' pleas for major reformulation. Working a
policy initiative through the legislative system, however, involves a
confrontation between two systems of power, the executive branch and
Congress, each relatively autonomous with respect to the other. The
implementation of Reaganomics at the legislative stage would require the
practice of three kinds of political skills. The first skill was coping with
historic legislative institutional barriers to executive domination. The second
skill was the exploitation of opportune circumstances that offer promise of
presidential influence in the legislative process. The third skill was the ability
to bargain shrewdly in the policy marketplace.
A. Institutional Opposition
As a general rule, any president must expect some measure of opposition
to his policies as an inherent aspect of the constitutional separation of
institutions. Thus, the legitimate, legal basis of legislative power, the different
electoral base of legislators, the different electoral calendars of Congress, the
different perspectives legislators share and different congeries of interests to
which their attention is directed all dispose Congress to policy preferences
often at odds with the presidential view.
If there is consensus on one point among students of modern
congressional politics, it is that on the legislative scale of values, lawmakers'
highest priority is the pursuit of the perceived interests of their constituents.
In the interest of getting reelected, most legislators attempt to acquire
constituent support by devoting their chief efforts to position-taking, credit
claiming, and manifesting concern for constituency well-being.38 Such
37. See Gregg, Let Us Act Together: Reagan Exhorts Congress, 39 CONG. Q WEEKLY REP. 331-32
(1981).
38. See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS, KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 50-71 (1977); J.
KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 29-71 (1981); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 52-77 (1974).
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preoccupations supersede the influence of presidents, lobbyists, sometimes
personal convictions, and, if necessary, loyalty to party.39
Congress' organization of its work presents another institutional obstacle
to executive penetration. A diffusion of power marks the contemporary
legislative chambers. Central party dominance of processes and outcomes is a
thing of the past. In modem times, Congress is marked by the distribution of
expertise, status, and influence among the leaders of semisovereign standing
committees exercising near-conclusive jurisdiction over their specialized
policy domains. The job of presidential persuasion, therefore, must involve
targeting not primarily a leadership figure, but a plurality of influential
careerists. In the House of Representatives in 1981, the Reagan
Admininstration had to contend with the influence and personal agenda of
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, and in the Senate,
with Republican Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole. The press
predictably gave attention to their reactions to the President's legislative
presentation speech in February, 1981. Rostenkowski was quoted as stating
that the President should be happy to get half of what he was asking and
Senator Dole serenely stated his assumption that the tax measure was "going to
be modified." 40
The preceding examples suggest only the beginning complexities of
legislative maneuvering. Obviously, the interleaved components of
Reaganomics engaged the interests and spheres of influence of numerous
other committees and subcommittees. In both houses, the appropriations
committees (and in the House especially, the many appropriations
subcommittees) would have to dispose of the Administration's domestic
budget-cutting proposals. Likewise, in both houses the budget committees
would play important roles in orchestrating the relationships between
revenue, spending, and deficit management within the context of
congressional decisionmaking.
Moreover, by 1981, traditional executive-legislative conflict had been
reshaped by recent ambitious congressional attempts to assert independence
and compete more effectively with executive policy leadership. Thus, the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 not only placed restraints on
the president's authority to impound appropriated funds, but more
importantly, created the congressional budgetary process which provided the
capability for imposing greater responsibility on legislative policymaking and
undergirding that responsibility with the independent source of expertise
offered by the Congressional Budget Office. 4 1 The spirited growth of
congressional staff during the decade of the seventies was yet another
indicator of the lawmakers' determination to enhance their competitive
39. See J. KINGDON, supra note 38, at 117-20.
40. Gregg, supra note 37, at 332.
41. See J. HAVAMENN, CONGRESS AND THE BUDGET (1978); A. SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY:
BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING (1980); A. SCHICK, RECONCILIATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET PROCESS (1981).
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advantages vis-a-vis the executive. 42 In sum, professional assessments of
Congress in the early 1980's characterized the institution as "new" and
"resurgent," suggesting notably the institution's increased ability to rebuff
presidential dominance. 43
Finally, that the House of Representatives in 1981 remained controlled by
the opposition party constituted yet another obstacle to cooperation between
the legislative and executive branches. The normal expectation in such
instances of divided government is that the legislative branch will undermine
and oppose presidential policies, especially those which run counter to the
historic partisan principles of the opposition. Surely, the thrust of
Reaganomics seemed to justify the normal expectation. In the case of
Reaganomics, however, the normal expectation did not come to pass.
B. Exploiting Opportune Circumstances
As with most understandings about political and social relationships,
principles which are generally accurate and admonitory can be softened by
intervening variables in a specific contextual application. Such was the case in
1981 when some of the legislative barriers to presidential agency proved
permeable as a result of the interplay of other factors specific to the time. At
the outset, the fact that the Senate was under Republican control for the first
time in a quarter century was significant. In terms of procedural advantage,
Republicans controlled scheduling, staff allocation, committee chairmanships,
favored access to the White House, and profited by the incalculable quality of
morale enhanced by the recent and unaccustomed electoral triumph. It is
true that congressional parties are never monolithic in behavior and that
several of the Senate Republican leaders (Dole, Hatfield, Mathias) took
positions deviating from the White House line from time to time.
Nevertheless, a remarkable exercise of party unity produced the successful
adoption of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)44 in the chamber.
Between July 23 and July 29, 1981, some twenty-seven votes were taken in the
Senate on amendments offered to the Administration tax package. In only
one of those twenty-seven tests was an amendment adopted which ran
counter to the leadership's position and split the Republicans badly. In every
other instance, crushing majorities of Republicans were responsible for the
adoption of favorable amendments or the rejection of hostile amendments. A
large number of these votes recorded unanimity among the President's
partisans. On only a handful of votes did more than one or two Republicans
deviate. On the crucial Finance Committee amendment that assured adoption
42. Congressional committee staff personnnel grew from 1,337 in 1970 to 3,057 in 1979. M.
MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 253 (1980); see also H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE
FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING 12-32 (1977).
43. See, e.g., T. MANN & N. ORNSTEIN, THE NEW CONGRESS (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1981); I.
SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS (1981).
44. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Scat. 172 (1981).
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of the President's package, the Republican vote was fifty-two to one with only
Senator Mathias dissenting.45
A second factor favoring the Administration's cause in Congress was the
instrumental role played by the conservative coalition in the House. Since the
1930's, American legislative issues of significance have led to the mobilization
of a coalition in which conservative southern Democrats make common cause
with the Republicans. In addition to caucusing and engaging in strategic
cooperation, members of the coalition habitually vote together on
ideologically freighted issues. 46 In terms of vote outcomes, the conservative
coalition won on a larger number of issues in 1981 than ever in recorded vote
analyses. The Congressional Quarterly (CQ), in monitoring roll-call vote
behavior, operationally defines a coalition as existing when a majority of
Republicans and a majority of Southern Democrats join in opposition to a
majority of Democratic party members. This coalition has appeared on about
one-fifth to one-quarter of total roll-call votes annually since CQ began
monitoring the process twenty years ago. In 1981, the coalition appeared on
21% of all congressional votes. What is remarkable, however, is that it was
victorious (carried the issue) in 92% of those appearances. 47 These
percentages clearly reflect the temporary condition of an assertively
conservative Administration appealing to the supportive instincts of the like-
minded in Congress. The evidence of its importance for the adoption of the
Economic Recovery plan specifically can be seen in the voting coalition that
brought about the adoption of ERTA in the House on July 29, 1981. While
the Democrats held a majority of 244 to 191 in the House, the chamber
adopted HR 4242, the Administration package, by a vote of 238 to 195.48
This vote was the result of the defection of forty-eight Democrats (at the time
labelled as "boll weevils") to the Reagan tax measure. Only one Vermont
Republican opposed his party's position. Thirty-eight of the forty-eight
Democratic defectors were southerners and of the forty-eight, forty also had
defected to the Administration budget-cutting cause a month earlier by voting
for the Gramm-Latta substitute budget resolution (overturning the House
Budget Committee's recommendation). 49
The campaign for the Reagan economic program in Congress was favored
by a third factor in the political environment of 1981-the weakness of the
opposition. The Democratic Party in Congress was in disarray. Its
presidential leadership, and many of its own liberal leaders had just faced
rejection at the polls. The Senate was, of course, controlled by the
Republicans. In the House, Speaker Thomas (Tip) O'Neill faced not only the
usual problem of conservative deviationists, but even an absence of unity or
coherence within the liberal faction. Programmatically, the Democrats
45. Senate Votes, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1416-19 (1981).
46. See B. HINCKLEY, STABILITY AND CHANGE IN CONGRESS 205-08 (1983); W. KEEFE & M. OGUL,
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 294-98 (1981).
47. Coalition Vote Study, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2800-01 (1983).
48. See 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 58H (1981).
49. Tax Vote Defectors, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1375 (1981).
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seemed unable to offer compelling alternatives to the Reagan construct. To
be sure, criticisms of budgetary hard-heartedness and inequity, of
contradictions among components of Reaganomics, and of the specter of
massive deficits could all be voiced with rationality and conviction. But there
was no comprehensive, alternative philosophy to contest Reaganomics.
Indeed, early on, the Speaker even surrendered some of his parliamentary
discretion by promising to schedule floor votes by midsummer on the
Administration's tax and spending programs. An O'Neill aide relayed to
journalist Lawrence Barrett the reason for this seemingly naive self-denial:
What the Democrats did, in extraordinary fashion, was to recognize the cataclysmic
nature of the 1980 election results. The American public wanted this new President to
be given a chance to try out his programs. We weren't going to come across as being
obstructionists. 50
The Democratic leadership's sensitivity to public support for the President
suggests another contingent factor helpful to the Administration's cause-in
this instance a periodic factor which new chief executives enjoy every four or
eight years. This factor is the "honeymoon," a familiar phenomenon.
Typically, at least for the first months of a new presidency, the afterglow of
electoral triumph and the general goodwill of the citizenry are reflected in a
president's highest public opinion ratings. After the honeymoon is over (a
variable time, depending on circumstances), presidential popularity normally
goes into decline, rarely recovering its early levels. 5 ' Consistent with historic
experience, the spring and summer months of 1981 saw Reagan riding the
crest of his popularity, with periodic Gallup Poll approval ratings hovering
around 60%.52 The halo effect of public approbation extends to the media
and to Congress even when the president's party does not control the body.
Reagan exploited this opportunity, along with others we have noted, in the
process of bargaining out the details of implementation of his economic
program.
C. Bargaining and Persuading
The first and most important strategic decision Reagan made concerned
timing and priorities. The reorientation of economic affairs was priority
number one. And the assertion of that priority would constitute his first act of
policy leadership. Thus, the President established the legislative decision
agenda for 1981 in his first two weeks in office. Maintaining the preeminence
of his agenda demanded that competing issues be shunted aside. The chief
50. Interview quoted in L. BARRETr, supra note 27, at 147. A New York Times analysis of polls in
June indicated that the Republican Party was attracting the largest number of adherents since 1928,
and there was discussion of a possible House takeover in 1982. See N.Y. Times Mag., June 14, 1981,
§ 6, at 110-15.
51. See G. EDWARDS III & S. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: POLMCS & POLICYMAKING 109-
12 (1985); see also Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson, 64 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 18-34
(1970).
52. On the special Gallup Poll question concerning the President's handling of the economy,
from March through August 1981, Reagan's scores ranged up to 60% approval and never fell below
50%. Overview of Reagan Approval Measurements, 195 GALLUP REP. 60 (1981).
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contenders for attention within the President's own party were three items
usually referred to as social issues. Thus, proposals to amend the
Constitution to permit school prayers, to prohibit public funding of abortions,
and to prohibit busing for school desegregation were sharply divisive,
emotional demands that could not be permitted to overshadow the top
priority.53 To this end, the cooperation of Senate Majority Leader Howard
Baker in controlling the Senate agenda and restraining his extreme right-wing
colleagues was crucial, as were the massaging ministrations of the White
House legislative liaison operation. The price paid by the President in
criticism from the far right was minimal, due largely to his successful
assuagement of domestic hawks. As the legislative contest followed its course
in the summer months, the Administration would let other issues flag, such as
the sale of aircraft to Saudi Arabia, revision of the Clean Air Act, and
reinstitution of important provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 54
A key aspect of the job of presidential persuasion in the legislative process
is the creation of indirect pressures on Congress from outside the institution.
This pressure takes two basic forms: the mobilization of citizen support
through presidential addresses and public appeals delivered at key stages in
the process, and the courting of interest group allies in the campaign for
legislative leverage. Both the President and his administrative aides
performed these functions skillfully and effectively.
Reagan must be given recognition for having personally managed the
communications function as well as having executed it. There were three
major public appeals in 1981: (1) the general adumbration of Reaganomics in
a nationally televised speech from the Oval Office on February 5; (2) formal
presentation of the economic package to ajoint session of Congress on prime-
time television on February 18; and (3) a final televised appeal to the nation
on July 27, two days before the crucial vote in the House of Representatives. 55
The February 5 speech was timed for public impact just before a weekend
congressional recess when most members would be testing citizen reaction in
their constituencies. Substantively, the address was all accommodation and
cooperation. The day before the address, competing texts were being
debated in the White House and the President, dissatisfied with both, jotted
down the main points he wished to make. Significantly, the editing job
involved deletion of partisan thrusts at the Democrats and heaping blame for
the state of the economy wholly on his predecessors. Rather, the speech was a
call for unity and cooperation in greater public interest. The feedback from
lawmakers' districts testified to the accuracy of presidential instincts. The
February 18 speech showed the stamp of both the President and his top White
House aides. Language which criticized the Fed, which articulated the
53. Nathan, The Reagan Presidency in Domestic Affairs, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 50-51 (F.
Greenstein ed. 1983).
54. Seizing the Helm, 13 NAT'LJ. 1404 (1981).
55. Address to the Nation on Federal Tax Reduction Legislation, PUB. PAPERS 664-68 (July 27,
1981).
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conservative iddefixe of the gold standard, and which echoed technical supply-
side dogma in the economic report submitted by George Gilder, was excised.
The reaction of Treasury supply-side zealots was disillusionment. Craig
Roberts wrote a memo to a Treasury aide lamenting:
I think it is extraordinary that in the first Reagan economic report (even if a mini-
report), the first explicitly supply-side President ever elected to office provides no
explanation whatsoever of the new policy that he is the carrier of and for which he has
made so many claims.
5 6
While some economic theorists were unhappy, the speech played well
before its intended audience. Likewise, the speech ofJuly 27 (when the point
of resolution was imminent in Congress) was one part of a broad frontal
assault on congressional opponents and waverers. After the speech,
congressmen compared the number of constituent communications they had
received. The Capitol switchboard load doubled the next day and Western
Union mailgrams to the Capitol quadrupled the normal volume. "The
bottom line is, the President blew them away," was the verdict of White
House Chief of Staff, James Baker. Speaker O'Neill concurred: "We are
experiencing a telephone blitz like this nation has never seen. It's had a
devastating effect."57
The natural interest group source of support for the Reagan program was,
of course, the business community. The major organizations did indeed
deliver for the Administration in the end. Top spokesmen for such groups as
the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and
National Federation of Independent Business suppressed their skepticism
about the size of the supply-side tax cut because of the business subsidy
elements of the package, notably the accelerated depreciation amendment.
There was, at one stage of the bargaining process, some wavering on the part
of business groups. 58 Nonethless, the Carlton Group (signifying the
Washington hotel where the business elite would meet, eat, and plan strategy)
at length placed its stamp of approval on the "sweetened" package of late
July.59
Ultimately, the Reagan program emerged from the legislative bazaar intact
in its essentials after the final challenge of working the system had been met:
direct, head-to-head bargaining between President and legislators. To
appreciate the nature of the bargains struck and the appropriateness of
strategies and tactics involved, one must consider some of the detailed
elements of the package as it made its way through the process. Such an
analysis is provided in the next section.
56. P. ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 103.
57. Wehr, White House Lobbying Apparatus Produces Impressive Tax Vote Victory, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1372 (1981).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
59. Keller, Democrats and Republicans Try to Outbid Each Other in Cutting Taxes for Business, 39 CONG.Q WEEKLY REP. 1133 (1981).
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D. Synopsis
(1) The initial February proposal called for a "clean bill"--one which
enacted two major principles, personal tax reductions of 10% each year for
three consecutive years and, second, a major business tax reduction which
greatly shortened the depreciation period during which companies could
claim tax credits for such costs as buildings, vehicles, and equipment.60
(2) The main response during the April-May deliberations in the House
was the Rostenkowski (House Ways and Means Committee) counter of a one-
year tax cut and, as a strategy to court boll weevils, a "conservative" proposal
to cut the top marginal tax bracket rate on unearned income from 70% to
50%.61
(3) June brought a standoff between Reagan and Rostenkowski on the
personal tax cut, the President holding firm to the three-year principle. The
President was pleased to accept a reduction from 70% to 50% in the top
marginal tax bracket, something he had originally sought anyway. 62
(4) With an early arrangement with Rostenkowski unattainable, the
Administration gave its support to a "bipartisan" Hance-Connable substitute
for the Ways and Means bill. (Kent Hance was a conservative Democrat from
Texas and his colleague, Barber Connable, was the ranking Republican on the
House Ways and Means Committee.) The substitute produced a 5%, 10%,
10%, thirty-three-month personal tax cut, a somewhat reduced depreciation
write-off subsidy, and a laundry list of special interest tax benefits to various
competing groups perennially lined up at the revenue trough. 63
(5) A bidding war between Democrats and Republicans over specific
benefit offers to particular interests and a return to a more hospitable
business depreciation subsidy constituted the major developments in the final
stage. When the House adopted the Hance-Connable substitute for its "own"
Ways and Means Committee version, the Administration forces had won the
bidding war.64
What remains is to identify the nature of the negotiating activities and
their orchestration in this exercise. A good starting point is the idea of work
itself in the literal sense. Successful policy bargaining requires persistent,
lengthy, patient, and determined devotion to the job at hand. Reagan
demonstrated his willingness and ability personally to struggle to the end.
The strategically timed speeches, the now legendary telephone calls, the
White House dinners, photo opportunities, and the boundless promises of
favors are testimonials to the old and new fashioned lobbying skills practiced
in 1981.65 In the course of the campaign, the President may well have gained
60. H.R. 4260, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
61. Fessler, House Floor Battle Looming on Tax Cut Bill, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1323, 1324
(1981).
62. Id at 1323-24.
63. H.R. 3849, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
64. H.R. 4242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H4898-4905 (daily ed. July 24, 1981); see
also 127 CONG. REC. H5992 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1981).
65. Wehr, supra note 57, at 1372-73.
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significant support by proffering amendments to aid the constituencies of
individual members (such as the $2500 tax credit to holders of gas and oil
royalties) and by making promises not to campaign against Democrats who
supported the economic program.66 The President did not rely on favors
alone, however. In June, the President threatened to use his constitutional
authority to force Congress to stay in session in August if work on the tax
program was incomplete-a threat that could not be dismissed as empty,
given the President's standing in the opinion polls at the time.67
The determination of the President not to give in on the three-year tax cut
principle-seen as stubbornness by some in his own Administration-
suggests his own sense of bargaining advantage. In addition, skillful analysis
by his White House legislative apparatus was helpful. Lawrence Barrett cites
evidence of the analytical quality of the Legislative Study Group's intelligence
in a June memorandum to the President which probed Chairman
Rostenkowski's personal and political motives:
Some think that he would like to have compromised last week, but that he simply
could not control the left side of his committee. He is in a difficult situation. He now
runs the risk of being "rolled" in his first time out as chairman of Ways and Means
(and with his eye on the Speakership). On the other hand, by not compromising with
us he preserves his position with O'Neill and with the liberal wing of the Democratic
Party. And if-as they think likely-our economic policies fail, they could become the
ultimate winners.
68
The President and his forces can be charged with only one major
miscalculation at a significant juncture in the bargaining process. As the pitch
of bargaining heightened, the President made a gesture to those who feared
the deficit costs of his program. In a June 4 compromise, the Administration
announced support for reductions in the business depletion write-off benefits.
Since these had been the primary inducement to business to suppress its
skepticism about Kemp-Roth and support the President, the fraternity now
felt betrayed. The Rostenkowski forces seized the opportunity by bidding for
business support of the Ways and Means version by offering new gratuities.
And for a brief time, business did indeed dally with unaccustomed legislative
patrons. Within days, however, the Administration recouped by promising, in
private meetings with lobbyists, the restoration of depreciation advantages.
In a week the business elite renewed support of the Reagan package. One
lobbyist thought that perhaps organized business should have let the
President dangle a bit longer:
I think all the groups came back on board much too quickly. There was more to gain
[by waiting]. But it's awfully difficult to turn down the personal lobbying of the
President of the United States, especially when their hearts are with him anyway. 69
The preceding events constitute an example of how Reagan, in working
his initiative through the legislative system, permitted elements of ideology to
66. Keller, supra note 59, at 1133, 1136.
67. Wehr, Reagan May Try to Block August Recess If Work Unfinished on Tax Cut Measure, 39 CONG. Q
WEEKLY REP. 1134-35 (1981).
68. L. BARRETr, supra note 27, at 167-68.
69. Keller, supra note 59, at 1136.
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give way to pragmatic strategy. Clearly, the largest concession the President
made was in permitting his pristine clean bill to become a vehicle for meeting
the demands of a host of special interests with a grab-bag of (sometimes
inconsistent) tax benefits. Although possessing inbred convictions about the
proper direction of social, economic, and political change, Reagan was not
immobilized by ideological rigidity and recognized that the calculus of means
and ends dictated that concessions be made.
IV
POLICY ARENAS AND PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY
Examination of public policy processes by students of government
traditionally considers the stages of the process, institutional perspectives and
interactions, and the forms in which power and influence are distributed and
exercised. The foregoing pages have exemplified that orientation. There is
another twist to the analytic kaleidescope, however, which may serve to
rearrange the explanatory pieces into a new configuration explaining partially
the consummation of the Reagan revolution. The new unit of analysis is
defined as the type of public policy under investigation. For at least two
decades, political scientists have examined arenas of domestic policy which
are constructed by looking at the impact of the policy on society and at the
relationships among the participant policy actors. Although there have been
elaborations and refinements of the originally proposed types, the three
major arenas continue to be provocative of research and further theorizing.
These are the distributive, the regulatory, and the redistributive types. 70 The first
two policy types will be characterized briefly, the third in more depth.
Much of the activity of modern American government involves the
distribution of value to individuals and groups. These benefits typically take
the form of money, but may include services, and even occasionally status.
The benefits are distributed individually to groups of supplicants without any
explicit relationship among them. Typically, they are not perceived, at least in
the short run, as being granted to some at the expense of others. Examples
range from public works projects, agricultural subsidies, and mortgage
insurance loans, to grants to localities for hospital construction, educational
aid, or scientific research support. These policies are so pervasive, so
routinely enacted and reenacted, and so widely sought that they tend to be
activities of low public salience and low controversy. A large proportion of
the body of distributive policies is processed by stable subsystems of political
actors composed of high level bureaucrats, congressional committee leaders,
and interest group operatives. These mutually accommodating political
subsets are sometimes referred to as the "iron triangle." The phenomenon of
70. This influential policy typology was originally proposed by Professor Theodore Lowi of
Cornell University in 1964. See Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, 16
WoRLD POL. 690-91 (1964); Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, 32 PUB. AD. REV. 298-310
(1972). An example of a widely read application and elaboration is R. RIPEY & G. FRANKLIN,
CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980).
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distributive politics is an outgrowth of the emergence of the positive, social
service state, the growth of bureaucracy, and the potency of modem interest
group activity.
The other face of the modem state looks in the direction of restraint rather
than beneficence. Thus, regulatory policies are characterized by state
limitations placed upon the discretion of individuals and groups. The
regulatory hand of the modem American state extends far beyond legal
restraints on types of criminal activity to limitations on business behavior, the
lending of money, the provision of transportation, the emission of pollutants,
and thousands of other private and commercial activities of citizens. Winners
and losers are more prominent in the regulatory arena and thus bargaining
over the achievement of or avoidance of a new state restraint is less routine,
more conflict laden, more politically salient, and engages the participation of
more high-level political actors than does the distributive environment.
On a scale of controversy, redistributive policies attract the sharpest conflict
and are the most difficult to enact. This is because they are perceived as
overtly benefiting one group in society at the expense of others. Fundamental
reallocations are seen as taking place. Established relationships in income,
class, status, and even rights are challenged in the redistributive arena. Thus,
an antipoverty program which seeks to uplift the status of the poor (at a cost
to the middle class), a voting rights act which seeks to secure the political
rights of one sector of the society at high potential cost to a previously
advantaged sector (with a monopoly of political power), or the enactment of a
tax measure which is seen as having the consequence of redistributing
income, are all examples of policies fraught with political passion.
With the last example, we have conjured the stage on which the Reagan
revolution was played out. Since redistributive issues involve reallocation of
fundamental values, they are inevitably couched in ideological terms of debate
between two polar opposites-liberal-conservative, rich-poor, we-they. As
such, they achieve high political prominence. For a time, pragmatic,
accommodationist American politics becomes starkly partisan and divisive.
Salience is high. Attention is paid. Peak political actors are engaged. And-
of greatest significance in the rhythms of American politics-overt
presidential initiative and persistent presidential support characterize the
great import and high drama of redistributive issues.
And how is the great conflict which accompanies such confrontational
positions resolved? In democratic politics, rarely does one side or the other
achieve total victory. Frequently, a temporary, partly symbolic conquest is
achieved and then slowly disaggregated and dissipated by subsequent political
revisions which often have the character of distributive politics. For example,
the Johnson war on poverty was apparently won in 1964 with the Economic
Opportunity Act. 71 In the years that followed, concessions to strident
71. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964).
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opposition groups and local political establishments came more and more to
resemble the traditional ethic of distributive payoff.72
In the instance of the Reagan economic program, a fundamentally
redistributive program was established by making concessions to distributive
imperatives in the very process of legislative implementation. The resolution
of a redistributive conflict was achieved by side-payments to a sufficient
number of claimants of the distributive largess of government. Put simply,
the demands of thrift institutions for tax exempt savings certificates, of high
technology industries for tax credits to stimulate research, of farmers for
inheritance tax relief, of international firms for tax reduction for overseas
workers, and of distressed industries (the automobile and railroad industries,
for example) for investment tax credits-each of these and dozens more were
met in distributionist concessions to resolve the basic conflict over the
redistributive thrust of the core economic program.73 Professors Ripley and
Franklin arrived at a general theoretical conclusion about the redistributive
policy process which is here confirmed:
The attainment of redistributive policy is achieved at a cost of diluting its impact by
adding or emphasizing distributive elements. Programs that are purely redistributive
are virtually impossible to enact. Programs that have distributive elements broaden
the base of support and both camouflage and reduce the redistributive elements.
7 4
The true nature of the redistributive quality, and thus the core
revolutionary impact of the Reagan economic program, needs to be specified
sharply. In the short run, redistribution of fiscal rewards in class terms is
apparent. The first major examination of the consequences of Reaganomics
published by the Urban Institute in 1982 concluded that Administration
programs
provide modest income gains (after taxes and transfers) for the average household.
However, the gains to families in the upper income brackets are quite large and, on
average, low income families will experience a small net loss. .. . It is clear that the
changes introduced thus far make the distribution of incomes less equal and require
some sacrifices by low-income families.
7 5
More recently, a Congressional Budget Office study reached the same
conclusion, calculating that the tax and spending programs result in a net
income loss of $390 to households with incomes under $10,000 and a net
income gain of $8,270 to households with incomes of $80,000 and more. 76
The greater potential, long-term redistributive effect of Reaganomics,
however, is more fundamentally systemic. That is, the premise of the Reagan
world view is a belief in reallocation of governmental functions. This means less
direct social service activity (program cuts), less interference with free market
forces (deregulation), and more public encouragement to economic
72. R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, supra note 70, at 172-74.
73. See the extended catalogue of ERTA's tax subsidy provisions in Keller, supra note 59, at
1132-33. See also Samuelson, For the Economy, Unanswered Questions, 13 NAT'LJ. 1405-10 (1981).
74. R. RxpLEY & G. FwRaIN, supra note 70, at 201-02.
75. J. PALMER & I. SAWHILL, THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT-AN EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 383 (1982).
76. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1984, § A, at 17, cols. 4-6.
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enterprise. To the extent that total government revenue shrinks severely
(which of course has happened), the seeds are planted for a long-term
slowdown in the growth of domestic support programs.
A final question asks how redistributive policies come about. One answer,
which points to presidential agency, has already been suggested. Since
modern presidents have come to be recognized as leaders and managers of
the national public policy process, their initiatives are crucial. Yet
redistributive initiatives are the most difficult of all domestic acts. For policy
ambitions of this sort to succeed, the broader political environment must be
permissive. Two kinds of observations may help to account for the facilitative
political climate of 1981.
The first of these looks to the presidency itself. Professor James David
Barber has analyzed the impact of the forces of presidential character on the
conduct of the office and the choices among policies. He has also recognized
that
Presidential character resonates with the political situation the President faces. It
adapts him as he tries to adapt it. . . . Besides the power mix in Washington, the
President has to deal with a national climate of expectations, the predominant needs
thrust up to him by the people.
77
It is that "climate of expectations" which seems significant at this point.
Professor John Kingdon, in a perceptive study of policies and their agendas,
has observed the phenomenon of a "national mood," which politicians sense
is an important conditioner of choice as well as an augury of success.
A shift in climate, according to people who are actively involved in making or affecting
public policy, makes some proposals viable that would not have been viable before,
and renders other proposals simply dead in the water.
78
Such a shift in climate and national mood had taken place by the opening
of the ninth decade of the century, and Ronald Reagan resonated with this
climate of expectations. The national mood was neither philosophically
motivated nor programmatically articulated. More than anything else the
mood was one of uncertainty mixed with disillusionment at the record of its
government in coping with the big problems in recent years. Reagan, a figure
out of the past, preaching the old-time religion, provided a political
alternative and his ideas, an opportunity for testing once again. It would not
be the first time in the American political experience that a dynamic presence
wedded to unconventional ideas had attracted the tentative support of the
voters.
The shift in mood, however, involved something more than diffuse,
uncertain longings for the promise of leadership-though that was important.
And this is central to the explanation of the early tolerance of Reaganomics.
Ajournalist assessing the Reagan tax victory ofJuly, 1981, concluded that the
major explanation of success was that the President had won the rhetorical
argument. Speaker O'Neill and Chairman Rostenkowski billed the
77. J. BARBER, supra note 13, at 8-9.
78. J. KINGDON, supra note 20, at 156.
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Democratic tax package as one which would benefit working Americans and
castigated the Reagan program as one of plutocratic "trickle-down"
inequities. Reagan, on the other hand, argued the equity of his program as
holding out tax relief to all brackets, from the highest to the lowest. The
public response in the summer of 1981 would suggest that Americans were
prepared to tolerate the Reagan prescription. 79
There is some independent evidence that traditional, egalitarian liberalism
did not claim the support of most Americans by the 1980's, and that "soak the
rich" proposals were viewed with skepticism. Public opinion specialist, Daniel
Yankelovich, in analyzing a variety of poll data including his own, had
concluded that many Americans expressed themselves in favor of programs to
"level-up" but opposed notions which promised "levelling down." He found,
for example, two-to-one majorities in support of reducing the capital gains tax.
His general conclusion would be chilling to the President's policy opponents:
But whatever the reason, the majority of Americans do not want any redistribution
that can be interpreted as taking away from the successful fruits of what they have
earned. The national psychology holds that those who play the game according to the
rules (and the rules include luck, hard work, and "good connections") are entitled to
their success, and should be able to reinvest liberally what they get.
80
The verdict must be that in 1981 Ronald Reagan was able to make a
revolution because he could count, if only temporarily, on the tolerance of a
middle class polity that was apparently prepared to engage with him in what
Lawrence Barrett has described as "Gambling With History.''81
V
AFTERWORD: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR THERMIDOR?
Even as the President was enjoying the fruits of his legislative victory, the
deepening recession made the gambles seem more treacherous. The tax cuts
turned out to be greater than expected. (Because of lower inflation, tax
bracket "creep" was slowed and the value of the depreciation deduction was
enhanced.) Spending increased in costly entitlement commitments as the
recession threw more people on government resources. By the summer of
1982, the deficit projections which had been a haunting specter to the
President's advisors a year earlier, were now underestimated realities.
The President was persuaded to take a step back in his conservative policy
crusade. On August 19, 1982, Congress passed, with Administration support,
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)82 which mandated a
$98.3 billion tax increase. The sources of these new revenues consisted of a
host of excise tax hikes, "corrections" of certain 1981 business gratuities
which had summoned higher inflation (such as the depreciation write-offs),
79. Kirchsten, Medium and Message, 13 NAT'LJ. 1427 (1981).
80. D. YANKELOVICH, NEw RuLEs 141 (1981).
81. L. BARRETr, supra note 27.
82. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
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and withdrawals or reductions in many of the special distributive benefits for
business legislated in 1981.83
Clearly, there were elements of reversal in the new measure. Hard-line
supply-side ideologues were devastated. Jack Kemp fought the President in
Congress. Former Treasury aide Craig Roberts characterizes TEFRA as "the
unravelling of Reaganomics." 8 4 The President's men billed the tax measure
as "fine-tuning," rather than as a significant departure from economic
principles. The real extent of the change probably rests somewhere between
these extremes. As Heclo and Penner have judged:
While some accuse him [Reagan] of doing a policy flip-flop, this is an exaggeration.
The tax bill is too important to be called a fine-tuning of his overall fiscal policy, but it
only offsets a relatively small portion of the 1981 tax cut and leaves in place a more
than 5 percent cut in overall tax burdens relative to GNP between fiscal 1982 and fiscal
1983.85
One indication of abiding elements of the philosophy of the Reagan
program in TEFRA is that the measure also contained the legislative
concession of spending reductions amounting to $17.5 billion in domestic
programs. Such cuts were concentrated in health programs, limits on
medicare payments to hospitals, and the like.86
In sum, if we may borrow a metaphor from the historians of more violent
revolutions and apply it to the innovations of 1981, it might be said that a
Thermidorean reaction had set in. That stage of convalescence following
revolution has frequently been observed and involves elements of restoration,
consolidation, and the softening of sharp edges. The historian, Crane
Brinton, has averred: "In some sense the phenomenon of reaction and
restoration seems almost inevitably a part of the process of revolution." 87
Whether indeed the events discussed in this essay constitute a historic turning
point in political-economic relationships or a massive aberration, only future
generations will be able to judge finally.
83. For an analysis of the provisions of the act, see Tate, Wehr & Sarasohn, Congress Clears $98.3
Billion Tax Increase, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2035-46 (1982).
84. P. ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 226-45.
85. Heclo & Penner, Fiscal and Political Strategy in the Reagan Administration, in THE REAGAN
PRESIDENCy 35 (F. Greenstein ed. 1983).
86. Tate, Wehr & Sarasohn, supra note 83, at 2035.
87. C. BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION 263 (1952).
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